nMIBAS: A Novel Multi-Receiver ID-Based Anonymous Signcryption with Decryption Fairness by Pang, Liaojun & Li, Huixian
Computing and Informatics, Vol. 32, 2013, 441–460
NMIBAS: A NOVEL MULTI-RECEIVER ID-BASED
ANONYMOUS SIGNCRYPTION WITH DECRYPTION
FAIRNESS
Liaojun Pang

















State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks
Xidian University
Xi’an 710071, China
Abstract. Based on the ring signature technology, the multi-receiver ID-based
anonymous signcryption (MIBAS) is proposed, and its goal is to protect the privacy
of the sender or so-called signer. In an MIBAS scheme, every receiver can verify
whether the sender is a member of a trusted group and thus ensure the reliability
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of the message source, but he could not get the real sender. However, MIBAS
paid no attention to privacy of the receivers and has not taken the privacy of the
receivers into account during its design. Our analyses show that there widely exist
the receiver privacy exposure and decryption unfairness problems in the existing
multi-receiver ID-based signcryption schemes. Motivated by these concerns, a new
multi-receiver ID-based anonymous signcryption (nMIBAS) is proposed to protect
the identity of the receivers. The nMIBAS scheme can not only solve the problem
that the existing schemes cannot protect the privacy of receivers, but also meet
the fairness of decryption to prevent the possible cheating behavior of the sender
effectively. Analysis shows that this scheme is a secure and effective signcryption
scheme.
Keywords: Decryption fairness, multi-receiver signcryption, ID-based signcryp-
tion, anonymity, signcryption
Mathematics Subject Classification 2010: 94A60
1 INTRODUCTION
In broadcasting or multicasting services, the message sender usually needs to trans-
mit some sensitive information by the broadcasting channel, and hopes that only
the authorized users can get the information while the unauthorized one can get
nothing. Therefore, the sender has to encrypt the message before broadcasting it.
On the other hand, the users also hope to authenticate the source of the received
messages to avoid receiving some boring information. Due to the two requirements
above, the concept of the multi-receiver signcryption [1] is proposed, which is the
fusion result of the multi-receiver encryption technology and the signcryption tech-
nology. Since the multi-receiver signcryption scheme can use only one signcryption
operation to implement broadcasting the same message securely to many receivers
simultaneously, it is more effective and practical than the traditional one-to-one
scheme, which makes it especially suitable for network secure broadcast and se-
cure multicast. At present, the multi-receiver signcryption and its applications have
become a hot spot in the field of information security.
However, as people paid more and more attention to personal privacy issues,
how to protect the identity of the participants from being exposed has been a chal-
lenge to multi-receiver signcryption designer. Recently, the multi-receiver anony-
mous signcryption [2] has been proposed, and it is expected to solve the sender’s
privacy exposure problem; that is to say, the sender hopes that the authorized users
only can verify whether the messages comes from a member of a reliable group but
cannot get the sender’s true identity. In such an anonymous scheme, the sender
of the messages hides his/her identity in a set of identities and uses his/her own
private key to signcrypt a piece of information, and then broadcasts the ciphertext.
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Upon receiving the ciphertext, each authorized receiver can use his/her private key
to verify the validity of the ciphertext and decrypt it to get the plaintext.
In practical applications, participant privacy does not mean only the privacy
of the sender; the receivers also want to keep it secret to others that they have
received a message. Unfortunately, none of the existing multi-receiver signcryp-
tion schemes [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9] have taken receiver privacy into account. In fact,
these schemes completely reveal receiver identity in the ciphertext, because in these
schemes, the list of identities of all authorized users and the correlation order is
a part of the ciphertext. In addition to the privacy issues, this kind of disposal in
the existing schemes can also lead to the decryption unfairness problem, that is to
say, when the ciphertext information is partly damaged, it is possible for part of
the authorized users to decrypt the ciphertext correctly while it is impossible for
others. This decryption unfairness problem can definitely affect the applications of
the multi-receiver signcryption scheme. Moreover, this weakness can probably give
a chance to the sender to cheat a receiver whom s/he hates by sending him or her
a partly distorted message, without being perceived.
Motivated by these concerns, we shall propose a new scheme to solve the re-
ceivers’ identity exposure and decryption unfairness problems. In our scheme, the
ciphertext does not include the list of the receiver identities directly, which avoids the
receiver’s privacy exposure. At the same time, the whole ciphertext of our scheme is
necessary for each receiver to implement the correct decryption, and any distortion
in the ciphertext will lead to impossible decryption to all receivers. Compared with
the existing schemes, in addition to secrecy and unforgeability, our scheme also has
the following advantages:
1. The receiver is kept anonymous. The identity of the receiver will not be leaked
by the ciphertext like the existing schemes, which can protect their privacy.
2. Decryption process is fair for all the receivers, which makes all authorized re-
ceivers have the same probability to get the correct plaintext.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce related
works. In Section 3, we introduce some preliminaries about mathematical back-
grounds and security definitions used in this paper. In Section 4, we present our
proposed scheme in details. In Section 5, we prove our scheme’s security, and then
evaluate and compare it with the existing schemes. In Section 6, we summarize our
work.
2 RELATED WORK
The concept of signcryption was first proposed by Zheng [7] in 1997, and its main
idea is to deal with the public key encryption and digital signature at the same
time. Compared with the traditional signature-then-encryption mode, this method
needs less computation and communication cost. Since then, researchers paid more
and more attention to signcryption [8, 9]. In 2002, the first ID-based signcryption
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scheme [8] was proposed. However, these schemes are only one-to-one scheme, that
is to say the sender could signcrypt a message only for one receiver in each operation.
When the sender needs to transmit the same message to multiple receivers, s/he has
to repeat the same signcryption process for each receiver.
When transmitting the same message to many receivers, the traditional encryp-
tion scheme is low in efficiency and real time because the same encryption process
should be repeated multiple times [10]. Therefore, the concept of multi-receiver
encryption is put forward. Fusing the concept of multi-receiver encryption and the
thought of signcryption, Duan et al. [1] put forward the first multi-receiver ID-based
signcryption in 2006. In their scheme, the sender signcrypts the messages once, and
each authorized receiver can use his/her own private key to check the validity of
the received ciphertext and decrypt it simultaneously. However, in its scheme, the
ciphertext includes every receiver’s identity information which is necessary for de-
cryption, because without the list of the receivers, the receiver cannot correctly
locate and find what s/he needs for the decryption. Although the receiver list is
not definitely included in the ciphertext of the scheme [1], we think that missing
the receivers’ identity list may be caused by inattention of the authors. In 2007,
a more efficient multi-receiver ID-based signcryption algorithm was proposed in [3],
and it definitely added a receivers’ identity list into the ciphertext, which corrects
the mistake in [1]. Since then, other similar schemes [4, 5] have been put forward
early or late.
The design philosophy of anonymous signature was derived from ring signature,
which was proposed by Rivest et al. [11] in 2001 originally. This scheme assures
that the receiver could not know the real signer (i.e. the sender) of the messages,
but can verify whether the signer is a member of a trusted group, which will not only
satisfy the anonymity of the signer, but also ensure the reliability of the message
source. By using the ring signature, Huang et al. [12] proposed the first ID-based
anonymous signcryption scheme in 2005. With the same idea, Lal et al. extend it
to the multi-receiver case and proposed the first sender-anonymous multi-receiver
ID-based signcryption in [2]. In this scheme, the identity of the real sender is put in
a set of identities to achieve anonymity of the sender, and the receiver only knows
the received messages are signed by one person in this set and thus trusts the source
of the messages, but s/he cannot know who has signed the messages. In 2010, the
literature [15] proposed another multi-receiver signcryption scheme satisfying the
anonymity of the sender. In this scheme, there also exists the decryption unfeasibility
problem because of lack of the receivers’ identity list in the ciphertext. We also can
easily find that the existing multi-receiver anonymous signcryption [2, 15] schemes
only consider the anonymity of the sender, without taking the receiver’s anonymity
problem into account.
Through the above analyses, it can be concluded that either the existing multi-
receiver signcryption schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15] do not consider anonymity, or
they just consider the anonymity of the sender, and do not mention the receiver’s
anonymity. In fact, for all the above schemes, the ciphertext must include the
receivers’ identity list (maybe there is an omission in the schemes [1, 15]), because
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the receiver list and the receiver order help each receiver to locate and find what
s/he needs for the decryption in the ciphertext. However, including the receiver
list into the ciphertext can inevitably lead to some defects as follows. First, it
directly exposes the receiver identity, and in fact no one wants to reveal his/her
privacy in practical applications. Second, the needed information of each receiver
is only a part of the ciphertext, so there may exist the unfairness possibility in
decryption. If an error appears in the process of transmission, it will lead to the
result that some receivers can verify or decrypt the messages correctly, but others
can not. More serious problem is that the scheme is unable to avoid the sender’s
duplicitous attack, for example, the sender deliberately gives a wrong message to
a receiver [16, 17].
Motivated by these concerns, we shall present a new anonymous multi-receiver
signcryption scheme which can meet the receiver’s and the sender’s anonymity si-
multaneously. Our scheme uses a special set to confuse the real identities of the
receivers, and does not contain the receivers’ identity list in the ciphertext, so the
identity of each authorized receiver is sightless. Thus, not only the attacker cannot
get the information of the receivers, but also each authorized receiver cannot get
anything about others’ identity, so the receivers’ privacy issue is well solved. In
addition, because the ciphertext is transmitted by the broadcasting channel, anyone
can receive the broadcasted information but only the authorized ones can decrypt
correctly. So in our scheme we provide a method for the users to determine if they
have the decryption permissions to avoid the unnecessary decryption computation
of unauthorized users. Because the necessary information of each receiver is the
same, once some element is damaged, no receiver can decrypt it correctly, which
makes our scheme meet the decryption fairness.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Security Assumptions
In this section, we shall briefly introduce some security assumptions used in our
scheme.
Let G1 be an additive group and G2 be a multiplicative group of the same order q
and let P be a generator of G1. Let e : G1 ×G2 → G2 be a bilinear mapping. The
CDH and DBDH problems can be described as follows.
1. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem: Given 〈P, aP, bP 〉 for some
a, b ∈ Z∗q , to compute abP .
2. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem: Given 〈P, aP, bP, cP, Z〉
for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , Z ∈ G2, to decide if Z = e(P, P )abc.
Definition 1. CDH Assumption: We define an algorithm B with an output β ∈
{0, 1}, which has advantage AdvCDHB = Pr[B(P, aP, bP ) = abP : a, b ∈ Z∗q ] in
solving the CDH problem. If for any polynomial-time algorithm the advantage
AdvCDHB is negligible, we say that the CDH assumption holds.
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Definition 2. DBDH Assumption: We define an algorithm B with an output β ∈
{0, 1}, which has advantage AdvDBDHB = Pr[B(P, aP, bP, cP, e(P, P )abc) = 1] −
Pr[B(P, aP, bP, cP, Z) = 1] in solving the DBDH problem, where a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and
Z ∈ G2. If for any polynomial-time algorithm the advantage AdvDBDHB is negligible,
we say that the DBDH assumption holds.
3.2 Multi-Receiver Identity-Based Anonymous Signcryption (MIBAS)
Formal definition of a MIBAS scheme consists of four algorithms, namely: KeyGen,
Extract, Anony-signcrypt and De-signcrypt, described as follows.
KeyGen: The Private Key Generator (PKG) runs this algorithm to generate a mas-
ter key s0 and public parameters params. Note that the public parameters should
be published while the master key should be kept secret.
Extract: This is the private key extraction algorithm run by PKG. Inputting
an identity IDi, PKG’s master key s0 and the public parameter params, PKG
runs this algorithm to generate the private key di associated with IDi, namely
di = Extract(IDi, s0, params). Here, the identity IDi is used as the public key
and di is the corresponding private key.
Anony-signcrypt: This algorithm is run by the sender or so-called signer. In-
putting PKG’s public parameter params, a plaintext message M , a set of m
identities L = (ID1, ID2, K, IDm) selected by the sender, which contains the





n), and the sender’s private key ds, the sender runs this algo-
rithm to generate the ciphertext C associated with M , namely C = Anony-sign-
crypt(params,M,L′, L, ds). Note: In our MIBAS scheme, we shall let C meet
L′ /∈ C, and use a pseudo-identity list to replace the real receiver list L′ for the
sake of anonymity of the receivers.
De-signcrypt: This algorithm is run by the receivers. Inputting the ciphertext C,
PKG’s public parameter params, the receiver’s identity ID′i(i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n) and
his private key d′i, the receiver runs this algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext. If
the ciphertext C is valid and the receiver is an authorized one, this algorithm out-
puts the corresponding plaintext M , namely M = De-signcrypt(C, params, ID′i,
d′i); otherwise it outputs an error message ⊥.
3.3 Security Model
3.3.1 Message Confidentiality
For message confidentiality, the most widely accepted security model is the cipher-
text indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). It was proposed
in the scheme [8] first, and then Duan et al. [1] expanded it to the multi-receiver envi-
ronment, and described it as indistinguishability of ciphertexts under selective multi-
ID, chosen ciphertext attack (IND-sMIBSC-CCA). Later, Lal et al. [2] extended it
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to the anonymous environment, and described it as indistinguishable against chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-sMIBAS-CCA2), which is described as follows.
Definition 3. IND-sMIBAS-CCA2 (indistinguishable against chosen ciphertext at-
tacks (IND-sMIBAS-CCA2): Let A be a polynomial-time attacker. Let Π be a ge-
neral multi-receiver ID-based anonymous signcryption scheme. Consider that A in-
teracts with a Challenger B in the following game:
Setup: B runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a master key s0 and the sys-
tem public parameter params. Then, B gives params to A and keeps s0 se-
cret. Upon receiving params, A outputs n target identities denoted as L′∗ =
{ID′∗1 , ID′∗2 , . . . , ID′∗n }.
Phase 1: A probes B with the following queries adaptively.
Extract queries: Upon receiving the Extract query from A about the identity
ID(ID 6= ID′∗i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n), B runs the Extract algorithm to compute dID =
Extract(ID, s0, params), and then sends it to A.
Anony-signcrypt queries: A defines a group of m identities denoted as L =
{ID1, ID2, . . . , IDm}, a plaintext denoted as M , and a group of n receivers de-
noted as L′ = {ID′1, ID′2, . . . , ID′n}. B randomly chooses an identity IDi ∈ L,
computes its private key di and the corresponding ciphertext as C = Anony-sign-
crypt(params,M,L′, L, di). Then, B sends the ciphertext C to A.
De-signcrypt queries: A defines a group of m identities denoted as L = {ID1,
ID2, . . . , IDm}, a group of n receivers denoted as L′ = {ID′1, ID′2, . . . , ID′n} and
a ciphertext denoted as C. B firstly chooses a receiver ID′j ∈ L′, and computes
its private key d′j. If the ciphertext C is valid, B computes the plaintext as
M = De-signcrypt(C, params,M,L, d′j), and sends M to A; otherwise, outputs
an error message ⊥.
Challenge: A chooses a pair of messages (M0,M1) that have the same length,
and a group of m identities denoted as L∗ = {ID∗1, ID∗2, . . . , ID∗m}, where each
ID∗i (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) has not been used to query the Extract oracle. Upon
receiving the messages (M0,M1), B randomly chooses a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and
computes the ciphertext C∗ = Anony-signcrypt(params,Mβ, L
′∗, L∗, d∗i ), where
d∗i is the private key of ID
∗
i . Then, B sends C
∗ to A.
Phase 2: A issues new queries as in Phase 1. Here, A cannot ask the Extract
queries on anyone in L∗, nor ask De-signcrypt queries on the ciphertext C∗. Also,
A cannot ask De-signcrypt queries on the ciphertext C that is only different from
C∗ in the receivers’ information.
Guess At the end of the game, A outputs a guessed bit β′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β′ = β,
A wins the game.
The adversary A defined above is called an IND-sMIBSC-CCA2 adversary, and
its probability advantage is defined as follows:
AdvIND−sMIBSC−CCA2Π (A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β = β′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ . (1)
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If for any IND-sMIBSC-CCA2 adversary A, its guessing advantage is less than
ε within running time t, then we call the scheme Π to be (t, ε)-IND-sMIBSC-CCA2
secure.
3.3.2 Unforgeability
Any signcryption scheme should meet unforgeability, which means the sender can-
not deny the fact that s/he has signed some message. Duan et al. [1] defined the
unforgeability as strong existential unforgeability under selective multi-ID, chosen
message attack (SUF-sMIBSC-CMA). Similarly, Lal et al. [2] extended their defini-
tion to suit the anonymous case, and called it the existentially unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-MIBAS-CMA), which shall be described as
follows:
Definition 4 (EUF-MIBAS-CMA). Suppose F is a Forger, and let Π denote a mul-
ti-receiver ID-based anonymous signcryption scheme. Consider that F interacts with
a Challenger B in the following game:
Setup: B runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a master key s0 and the public
parameter params. Then, B gives params to F and keeps s0 secret.
Attack: F issues queries as those in Definition 3.
Forgery: F finally outputs a new ciphertext denoted as C∗ and a group of n re-
ceivers denoted as L′∗ = {ID′∗1 , ID′∗2 , . . . , ID′∗n }. If it can be checked that C∗ is
generated by ID∗s based on the plaintext M and L
∗ = {ID∗1, ID∗2, . . . , ID∗m} and
can be correctly decrypted by anyone in L′∗, F wins the game. Here, F cannot
ask Extract query on anyone in groups L∗ and L′∗, and C∗ can not be generated
by the Anony-signcrypt algorithm. The advantage of F is defined as its success
probability.
4 THE PROPOSED SCHEME (NMIBAS)
Our nMIBAS scheme includes the following four algorithms named KeyGen, Ex-
tract, Anony-signcrypt and De-signcrypt respectively, which are described as fol-
lows.
4.1 The KeyGen Algorithm
The KeyGen algorithm is carried out by PKG, and includes the following steps:
1. Let G1 and G2 be an additive group and a multiplicative group with the order
q ≥ 2k, where k is a given security parameter, and let P be a generator of G1.
Choose a bilinear mapping e : G1 ×G1 → G2.
2. Randomly choose an integer s0 ∈ Z∗q as the master key and let Ppub = s0P ∈ G1
be the corresponding public key. In succession, randomly choose P0 ∈ G∗1 and
compute g = e(Ppub, P0).
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3. Choose 4 cryptographic one-way hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1; H2 : G2 →
{0, 1}l0 ; H3 : {0, 1}l0 × G1 → Z∗q ; H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , where l0 denotes the bit
length of the plaintext message.
4. Publish the system parameter params = 〈G1, G2, q, e, P, Ppub, P0, g,H1, H2, H3,
H4〉, and store the master key s0 in a secure way.
4.2 The Extract Algorithm
The Extract algorithm should also be carried out by PKG. With params, s0 and
a participant identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input, PKG runs this algorithm process as
the following steps:
1. Compute the public key of the identity ID as QID = H1(ID).
2. Compute dID = s0QID, and let dID be the private key of the participant ID.
4.3 The Anony-Signcrypt Algorithm
The Anony-signcrypt algorithm is carried out by the message sender, that is to
say the sender of the message. Let IDS be the true message sender, and let L
′ =
{ID′1, ID′2, . . . , ID′n} denote the set of n receivers selected by the sender. With the
system public parameters params and a plaintext messageas M as input, IDS does
the following steps to signcrypt the message M :
1. Choose a set of participants L = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDm}, such that IDS ∈ L and
L∩L′ = φ. These participants are used to puzzle the message receivers and the
adversary to prevent them from obtaining the true identity of the sender.
2. Choose (m − 1) integersrandomly and compute Ri = uiP where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
m} \ {S}.
3. Randomly choose an integer uS ∈ Z∗q , and then compute α =
∑m
i=1 ui, U =
αP, σ = gα and W = H2(σ)⊕M .
4. Compute hi = H3(W,Ri) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ {S}, and let RS = uSQS −∑m
i=1,i 6=S(Ri + hiQi). Here, QS is the public key of IDS. At last, set R =
{R1, R2, . . . , Rm}.
5. Compute V = (uS +hS) · dS, where hS = H3(W,RS) and dS denotes the private
key of IDS.
6. Let xj = H4(ID
′
j) and yj = α(P0 + Q
′
j), where j = 1, 2, . . . , n and Q
′
j denotes
the public key of ID′j, and thus we can get n pairs: (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn).





= aj,1 + aj,2x + . . . +
aj,nx
n−1, where aj,1, aj,2, . . . , aj,n ∈ Zq.
8. For j = 1, 2, . . . , n, compute Tj =
∑n
j′=1 aj′,jyj′ and let T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}.
9. Define the ciphertext of the plaintext M as C = 〈U, V,W, T,R, L〉.
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4.4 The De-Signcrypt Algorithm
The De-signcrypt algorithm can be carried out by each authorized receiver. With
the ciphertext C = 〈U, V,W, T,R, L〉 and the system public parameters params as
input, each receiver ID′j(j = 1, 2, . . . , n) can use his/her private key d
′
j to decrypt C
to get the plaintext M , which can be shown as the following three sub-algorithms:
Verify sub-algorithm: This sub-algorithm is used to check the validity of the
senders in the set L.
1. Compute K =
∑m
i=1(Ri + hiQi), where hi = H3(W,Ri), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
2. Check whether the equation e(V, P ) = e(K,Ppub) holds. If yes, the sender
must be in the group L; otherwise, stop the process.
Judge sub-algorithm: This sub-algorithm is used to check the decryption rights
of the receiver.
1. Check whether the equation V · Q′j = K · d′j holds. If yes, ID′j can run the
following decryption process; otherwise, stop the process.
Decrypt sub-algorithm: This sub-algorithm is used to decrypt the ciphertext.
1. Compute δj = T1 + xjT2 + . . .+ (x
n−1
j modq)Tn, where xj = H4(ID
′
j).
2. Compute σ′ = e(Ppub, δj) · e(U, d′j)−1 and M = H2(σ′)⊕W . Here, M is the
plaintext message.
5 ANALYSES AND DISCUSSIONS
5.1 Correctness Analyses
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the Verify sub-algorithm). That is to say, the Verify
sub-algorithm can be used to verify the validity of the sender.
Proof. According to the process defined in Section 4.3, we have










(Ri + hiQi), Ppub
)
= e(K,Ppub). (2)
From Equation (2), it can be concluded that this theorem holds. 2
Theorem 2 (The correctness of the Judge sub-algorithm). That is to say, the
Judge sub-algorithm can be used to verify whether a receiver is an authorized one.
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Proof. For each ID′j(j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}), we have:









(Ri + hiQi) · d′j = K · d′j. (3)
That is to say, the equation V ·Q′j = K · d′j holds. 2
Theorem 3 (Correctness of the Decrypt sub-algorithm). That is to say, the De-
crypt sub-algorithm can recover the plaintext correctly.
Proof. For each ID′j(j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}), we can compute δj as follows:
δj = T1 + xjT2 + . . .+ x
j−i










1) + . . .+ xjan,2α(P0 +Q
′
n)) + . . .+
(xj−1j a1,jα(P0 +Q
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n)) + . . .+
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Then, we have σ′ = e(Ppub, δj) · e(U, d′j)−1, because:
σ′ = e(Ppub, δj) · e(U, d′j)−1
= e(Ppub, α(P0 +Q
′
j)) · e(αP, s0Q′j)−1
= e(Ppub, αP0) · e(Ppub, αQ′j) · e(s0P, αQ′j)−1
= e(Ppub, P0)
α · e(Ppub, αQ′j) · e(Ppub, αQ′j)−1
= gα = α. (5)
Through the results above, we have M = H2(σ
′)⊕W . 2
5.2 Security Analyses
Our multi-receiver anonymous signcryption scheme can meet the message confi-
dentiality, the signcryption unforgeability, the sender anonymity and the receiver
anonymity. Like the scheme [2], the sender anonymity problem is solved by using
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the ring signature technology, which makes anyone guarantee the sender is one of
a set of valid participants but cannot specify who is the exact sender. The sender
anonymity proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in [14], and it will not be
repeated here. In addition, the list of the receiver identities is not included in the
ciphertext, and this makes the receivers anonymous, which shall be discussed in the
next section. Therefore, here we should pay more attention to the message confi-
dentiality proof and to signcryption unforgeability, which can be described by the
following theorems.
Theorem 4 (Message confidentiality). Suppose that there is an IND-sMIBA-S-
CCA2 adversary A having an advantage ε to win the game defined in Definition 3
within running time t. (Here, assume that adversary A can ask qe queries to Extract,
qs queries to Anony-signcryption, qd queries to De-signcryption, and qHi queries to
Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) at most). Then, there is an algorithm B that can solve the DBDH
problem with an advantage ε′ ≥ ε− nqd
2k
within running time t′ ≤ t+4qdO(t1), where
t1 is the time consumed by a bilinear pair computation.
Proof. In the following section, we shall show how an algorithm B uses A to solve
the DBDH problem with an advantage ε′ within running time t′.
First, suppose B is given an instance of the DBDH problem as 〈P, aP, bP, cP, Z〉,
and its aim is to judge whether the formula Z = e(P, P )abc holds or not. B can
simulate the Challenger to execute each phase in Definition 3. During this process,
A can ask queries to Anony-signcryption, De-signcryption and Hi, i = {1, 2, 3, 4} or-
acles. The results of querying Hi, i = {1, 2, 3, 4} are stored in Hi-list, i = {1, 2, 3, 4}
respectively.
Setup: B sets P0 = bP and Ppub = cP , and let g = e(P0, Ppub) = e(bP, cP ) =
e(P, P )bc. Then, give A the system parameters params = 〈G1, G2, q, e, P, Ppub,
P0, g,H1, H2, H3, H4〉. On receiving the system parameter, A outputs n target
identities denoted as L′∗ = (ID′∗1 , ID
′∗
2 , . . . , ID
′∗
n ).
Phase 1: A queries B as follows.
H1-query: Input an identity IDk to H1. If there exists the tuple (IDk, lk, Qk) in
H1-list, return Qk; otherwise, do the following steps:
1. If IDk = ID
′∗
j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, choose an integer l′∗j ∈ Z∗q at random, and
compute Q′∗j = l
′∗
j P − P0. Otherwise, randomly choose an integer lk ∈ Z∗q
and compute Qk = lkP .
2. Put (IDk, lk, Qk) into H1-list, and return Qk.
Hi-query, i ∈ {2, 3, 4}: In order to reply to these queries, B should firstly access
the corresponding Hi-query, i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. If the corresponding query can be
found, return it to A. Otherwise, B should randomly choose an integer within
the suitable range as the query result and return it to A. At the same time, add
the query result to the corresponding list.
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Extract query: When B receives the private key extract query about the identity
IDk(here IDk 6= ID′∗j ), finds (IDk, lk, Qk) out from H1-list, and computes dk =
lkPpub = clkP . At last, return dk to A.
Anony-signcrypt query: When B receives the anony-signcrypt query (M,L,L′)
(here L = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDm} and L′ = {ID′1, ID′2, . . . , ID′n}), it randomly
chooses IDS ∈ L firstly, and then has two choices as follows:
1. If IDS 6= ID′∗j for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, B can access H1-list and compute the
private key of IDS as dS = lSPpub = clSP . Then, with (M,dS, L, L
′) as the
input of the Anony-signcrypt algorithm, B computes the ciphertext C and
returns it to A.
2. If there exits some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that IDS = ID′∗j , set QS = lSP −
P0. Then, choose u1, u2, . . . , uS, . . . , um ∈ Z∗q at random, and compute α =∑m
i=1 ui, σ = g
α and W = H2(σ)⊕M . For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}\{S}, compute
Ri = uiP and hi = H3(M,Ri), and then save them in H3-list. In succession,
compute U = αP , xj = H0(ID
′
j) and yj = α(P0 +Q
′
j) for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n.







n−1 such that aj,1, aj,2, . . . , aj,n ∈ Zq, and let Tj =
∑n
j′=1 aj′,jyj′ . For





i ) and V = uSPpub. Then, save (W,RS, hS) in H3-list. Finally, B outputs
the ciphertext C and returns it to A.
De-signcrypt query: A outputs a ciphertext C = 〈U, V,W, T,R, L〉 and a receiver
identity ID′j, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} to query B to start the De-signcrypt query.
If ID′j ∈ L′∗, B does not know the private key of ID′j, and thus it has to return
that the ciphertext C is invalid. However, if C is valid, the probability that A
does not find is not more than n
2k
.
If ID′j /∈ L′∗ and B can check whether the equation e(V, P ) = e(
∑m
i=1(Ri +





out δj. With the computation results above, B can compute σ
′ = e(Ppub, δj) ·
e(U, d′j)
−1 and then obtain the plaintext message as M = H2(σ
′)⊕W . At last,
B returns M to A. Otherwise, the ciphertext C is invalid and B only needs to
output the error message ⊥.
Challenge: A outputs two messages (M0,M1) with the same length and a set of m
participants denoted as L∗ = {ID∗1, ID∗2, . . . , ID∗m}. Here, the set of the receivers
L′∗ = {ID′∗1 , ID′∗2 , . . . , ID′∗n } is the aim of the attack. B randomly chooses a bit
β ∈ {0, 1}, and then signcrypts the message Mβ. First, B sets U∗ = aP , σ = Z,
and accesses H1-list to get the value l
′∗
j corresponding to ID
′∗
j , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Second, work out y∗j = l
′∗
j U
∗, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and T ′∗j , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. At
last, B generates a goal ciphertext C∗ = 〈U∗, V ∗,W ∗, T ∗, R∗, L∗〉 and sends it
to A.
Phase 2: A carries out multiple queries as in Phase 1. Here, it is noticed that
A cannot query the identity information in L∗ during the Extract queries, and
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cannot query the ciphertext during the De-signcryption queries. At the same
time, A cannot query a ciphertext C which is only different from that in the
pseudo-identity information T .
Guess: In the end, A should output its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β′ = β, B outputs 1
as the answer to the DBDH problem, because:





= e(cP, l′∗j U
∗)e(U∗, d′∗j )
−1
= e(cP, l′∗j aP )e(aP, l
′∗
j cP − cdP )−1




= e(P, P )abc. (6)
Otherwise, B answers 0.
Analyses: Now, we shall determine the probability advantage of B. For qd de-
signcryption queries, the probability that B rejects the valid ciphertext is not
more than nqd
2k
. If A wins the IND-sMIBAS-CCA2 game, the advantage of B is:







| = ε− nqd
2k
, and t′ ≤ t+ 4qdO(t1) (t1 is the time consumed by a bilinear
pare computation).
2
Theorem 5 (About the unforgeability). Assume that there is an EUF-MIBAS-
CMA adversary F which can win the game defined in Definition 4 with an ad-
vantage ε within running time t (here, assume that adversary F can ask qe queries
to Extract, qs queries to Anony-signcryption, qd queries to De-signcryption, and qHi
queries to Hi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) at most). Then, there is an algorithm B that can solve
the CDH problem with an advantage ε′ ≥ ε− qs
2k
within running time t′ ≤ t, where
t1 is the time consumed by a bilinear pair computation.
Proof. Here, we shall show how B uses F to solve the CDH problem with the
probability ε′ within running time t′.
First, let B receive a random instance 〈P, aP, bP 〉 of the CDH problem, and B’s
goal be to figure out abP . To solve this problem, B acts as the Challenger described
in Definition 4 to do the following steps.
Setup: B sets Ppub = bP and sends the system parameters params = 〈G1, G2, q, e,
P, Ppub, P0, g,H1, H2, H3, H4〉 to F . Upon receiving the parameters, F outputs
the target identity ID∗S. Here, the H1, H2, H3 and H4 queries should be carried
out like in Theorem 4.
Attack: F probes B with the following queries.
Extract query: F produces and identity ID(ID 6= ID∗S) and gives it to B.
B checks H1-list; if the tuple (ID, l, Q) exists, computes d = blP and returns it
to F .
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Anony-signcrypt query: Upon receiving an anony-signcrypt query about (m,L′,
L′, IDS) (where IDS ∈ L = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDm} and L′ = {ID′1, ID′2, . . . ,
ID′n}), B randomly chooses xi ∈ Z∗p , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and computes Ri =
xiP, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}\{S}, α =
∑m
i=1 xi, ω = g
α, and RS = xSQS−
∑m
i=1,i 6=S(Ri+
hiQi). Then, it computes U = αP and W = H2(ω) ⊕ M . In succession, B
checks H3-list, if (W,RS) exists, gets hS; otherwise, randomly chooses hS ∈
Z∗q and stores (W,RS, hS) in H3-list. Then, it computes V = (xS + hS)dS =
(xS + hS)lSbP . B searches H4-list to find the corresponding result xj of ID
′
i,
and computes yj = α(P0 + Q
′
j), j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, B can obain Tj, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}. At last, B obtains the ciphertext C and returns it to F .
Forgery: F generates a target ciphertext C∗ = 〈U∗, V ∗,W ∗, T ∗, R∗, L∗〉. If the











SP = aP , and then V















Now, it is easy for us to get the solution of the CDH problem abP = V ∗(x∗S +
h∗S)
−1.
Now, we shall determine the success advantage of B. In Anony-signcryption queries,
the probability that B fails is not more than qS
2k
, so we have ε′ ≥ ε− qS
2k
, and t′ ≤ t.
2
5.3 Performance Analyses
In this section, we shall analyze our scheme by comparing it with the existing multi-
receiver signcryption schemes in performance and efficiency.
5.3.1 Performance Comparisons
Table 1 shows the performance comparisons of our scheme with the existing sche-
mes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15].
We shall explain Table 1 as follows:
1. The receivers’ anonymity. Receivers’ anonymity means that each receiver is
anonymous for attackers and other receivers. On one hand, an attacker can
not get the ID information of any authorized receiver; on the other hand, every
authorized receiver can not get the ID information of the other authorized ones.
As the message is broadcasted by the sender, anyone can easily receive it. In
the existing schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15], the ciphertext requires a receiver list,
which denotes the information how the ciphertext is organized (in schemes [1,
15], the list has been omitted by the authors). Only in this way can a receiver
find the information s/he requires to decrypt the ciphertext. The receiver list
is just the ID information of the authorized receivers and their ID sequences,
thus exposing the ID of receivers directly, so the anonymity is not available.
However, during the signcryption process of our scheme, as the ID information
of all the authorized receivers is mixed by the Lagrange interpolation functions






























































































Table 1. Performance comparisons between the existing schemes and the proposed scheme
and hidden in the pseudo-identity list denoted by (T1, T2, . . . , Tn), any receiver
or attacker can not get any information on other authorized receivers. That
means our scheme possesses the receiver anonymity.
2. The decryption fairness. Decryption fairness means that for all authorized re-
ceivers, the probabilities of correctly decrypting the ciphertext are the same.
Once a part of bits in the message is missing or destroyed during the trans-
mission, no receiver can correctly decrypt it; but, in the existing multi-receiver
signcryption schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 15], as long as every receiver receives
the partial ciphertext message corresponding to its own ID, it can decrypt the
message unmistakably. Whether other receivers’ information goes wrong or is
destroyed or not does not affect its correct decryption. In this case, when some
receivers’ ciphertext information goes wrong while others’ is kept right during
the transmission, only these receivers can not decrypt normally, thus bringing
about decryption unfairness. Decryption unfairness can lead to spoofing attack
to some receiver by the sender easily. On the contrary, in the decryption process
of our scheme, every element in the ciphertext C = 〈U, V,W, T,R, L〉 is essen-
tial for all receivers, so when any element goes wrong, no receiver can decrypt
correctly. That is to say, the decryption process is fair for all the authorized
receivers in our scheme.
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3. The sender’s anonymity. Sender’s anonymity means the receiver can verify
whether the sender is a member of one trusted group and thus ensure the re-
liability of the message source, but s/he could not know the real sender of the
messages. Schemes [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] have not taken the sender’s anonymity into
account, and each receiver can know who the sender of the received messages
is. That is to say, these schemes are not anonymous ones. Based on the ring
signature technology, schemes [2, 15] and our scheme hide the real sender into
a group of identities L = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDm}, each of which is trusted by the
receivers. Therefore, the receivers can verify the validity of the message source,
but they cannot prove who the real sender is.
4. Our scheme also provides a method to judge whether a receiver is an authorized
one before his/her decryption. The ciphertext of the existing schemes [1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 15] includes the list of the receivers, so each receiver can easily know
whether s/he is an authorized one; but in our scheme, in order to achieve the
receivers’ anonymity, the ID information of the receiver is not included in the
ciphertext, so we must provide a method to let each receiver to judge whether
s/he is authorized to avoid unnecessary decryption operations. The formula
V ·Q′j = K · d′j in our scheme is used to deal with this problem. If the equation
holds for a receiver, s/he is authorized and can continue the following decryption;
otherwise, s/he should stop the algorithm.
5.3.2 Signcryption Efficiency Comparisons
Here, we should make a comparison of our scheme and the existing multi-receiver
signcryption schemes in signcryption efficiency, including calculation cost and com-








Scheme [1] 1 n+ 4 0 6 3
(n+ 3)|G1|+
|ID|+ |M | 10
Scheme [2] 0 1 3m+n−2 2m+n+1 m+ 1 (m+ n+ 2)|G1|+
M + (m+ n)|ID| 11
Scheme [3] 1 1 n+ 1 n+ 5 2
(n+ 2)|G1|+
|G2|+ |M |+ n|ID|
10
Scheme [4] 0 1 n+ 1 n+ 3 2 3|G1|+ |M |+n|ID| n+9
Scheme [5] 2 2 n+ 1 n+ 4 2
(n+ 2)|G1|+
|M |+ n|ID|+ |Zq |
8
Scheme [6] 1 1 2n− 1 4n+ 4 2 (n+ 3)|G1|+|M |+ (n+ 1)|ID| 9
Scheme [15] 1 2m+n+3 0 m+n+ 1 2
(m+ n+ 2)|G1|+
|M |+m|ID| 13
Ours 0 1 3m− 2 2m+ 1 m+ 1 (m+ n+ 2)|G1|+|M |+m|ID| 12
Table 2. Signcryption efficiency comparisons between the existing schemes and the pro-
posed scheme
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The following is the explanation of Table 2:
1. The ciphertext size. In our scheme, the ciphertext is denoted by C = 〈U, V,W, T,
R, L〉, and thus its length is (m+n+ 2)|G1|+ |M |+m|ID|. In scheme [15], the
true length of the ciphertext is (m+n+2)|G1|+ |M |+(m+n)|ID| after we add
the receiver list to the ciphertext (as discussed above, the receiver list should be
a part of the ciphertext, but has been omitted by the authors). The ciphertext
length of scheme [2] is also larger than ours. Although the ciphertext of schemes
[1, 3, 4, 5, 6] is smaller, they are not anonymous ones, that is to say, they
cannot meet the sender’s anonymity and the receivers’ anonymity. Compared
with the existing anonymous schemes, our scheme has shorter ciphertext, which
determines the low communication traffic in practical applications.
2. Then, we talk about the calculation cost. In our scheme, the goal of computing
fi(x) and Ti is to hide the identities of the receivers to achieve the anonymity
of the receiver. However, if the receivers are selected, fi(x) and Ti can be
computed in advance, so we do not consider their effect on the computation cost.
Therefore, in order to signcrypt a messageM , our scheme needs (3m−2) addition
operations, (2m + 1) scalar multiplications in G1 and 1 exponentiation in G2.
Because the most time-consuming operations are the bilinear pair computation
and the exponentiation, our scheme has evident advantages over the existing
ones in signcryption computation efficiency.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Most of the existing multi-receiver signcryption schemes cannot guarantee the ano-
nymity of the participants. Some given multi-receiver anonymous signcryption
schemes only take the anonymity of the sender into account, but no attention is paid
to the anonymity of the receivers. Especially, in the existing multi-receiver signcryp-
tion schemes, it is required to include the list of receivers into the ciphertext to de-
termine the authorized receivers, which discloses the identities of receivers directly
and leads to the decryption unfairness issue. Aiming at the receiver anonymity
problem and the decryption unfairness problem, in this paper we propose a new
multi-receiver anonymous signcryption scheme named nMIBAS. In nMIBAS, the
receivers’ identity ceases to be a part of the ciphertext, so the identity of each au-
thorized receiver is hidden and the anonymity of the receivers is guaranteed. The
entire ciphertext of nMIBAS is necessary for each receiver in decryption, and this
ensures fairness of decryption. At the same time, our scheme provides an effective
method for receivers to judge if they are authorized before encryption. Compared
with the existing schemes, our scheme has shorter ciphertext and less computation
overheads, which makes our scheme more practical than the existing ones. The
possible future work is to apply our scheme in practical network communications to
solve the security issue of multicasting or broadcasting.
nMIBAS: A Novel Multi-Receiver ID-Based Anonymous Signcryption 459
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under
Grant Nos. 61103178 and 60803151; the Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of
Higher Education of China under Grant No. 20096102120045; Basic Science Research
Fund in Xidian University under Grant No. K5051310006.
REFERENCES
[1] Duan, S. et al.: Efficient and Provably Secure Multi Receiver Identity based Sign-
cryption. Information Security and Privacy, 2006, pp. 195–206.
[2] Lal, S. et al.: Anonymous ID Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receivers.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/345, 2009.
[3] Yu, Y. et al.: Efficient Identity-Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Receivers.
Autonomic and Trusted Computing, 2007, pp. 13–21.
[4] Sharmila, S. et al.: An Efficient Identity-Based Signcryption Scheme for Multiple
Receivers. Advances in Information and Computer Security, 2009, pp. 71–88.
[5] Elkamochi, H. et al.: MIDSCYK: An Efficient Provably Secure Multirecipient
Identity-Based Signcryption Scheme. Networking and Media Convergence, 2009,
pp. 70–75.
[6] Qin, H. et al.: Identity-Based Multi-receiver Threshold Signcryption Scheme. Secu-
rity and Communication Networks, Vol. 4, 2011, No. 11, pp. 1331–1337.
[7] Zheng, Y.: Digital Signcryption or How to Achieve Cost (Signature & Encryption)
<< Cost (Signature)+Cost (Encryption). Advances in Cryptology, 1997, pp. 165–179.
[8] Malone, J.: Identity-Based Signcryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive. Report
2002/098, 2002.
[9] Miao, S. et al.: Cryptanalysis of a Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption
Scheme. International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Se-
curity 2010, pp. 593–597.
[10] Pang, L. J. et al.: Design and Analysis of a Provable Secure Multi-Recipient Public
Key Encryption Scheme. Journal of Software, Vol. 20, 2009, No. 10, pp. 2739–2745
(in Chinese with English abstract).
[11] Rivest, R. et al.: How to Leak a Secret. Advances in Cryptology, 2001, pp. 552–565.
[12] Huang, X. et al.: Identity Based Ring Signcryption Scheme: Cryptographic Prim-
itive for Preserving Privacy and Authenticity in the Ubiquitous World. Interna-
tional Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications 2005,
pp. 649–654.
[13] Zhang, J. et al.: A Novel ID-Based Anonymous Signcryption Scheme. Advances in
Data and Web Management 2009, pp. 604–610.
[14] Zhang, M. et al.: Analysis and Enhance of Anonymous Signcryption Model. Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/194, 2009.
460 L. Pang, H. Li, Y. Wang
[15] Zhang, B. et al.: An ID-Based Anonymous Signcryption Scheme for Multiple Re-
ceivers Secure in the Standard Model. Advances in Computer Science and Information
Technology 2010, pp. 15–27.
[16] Pang, L. J. et al.: Improved Multicast Key Management of Chinese Wireless Lo-
cal Area Network Security Standard. IET Communications, Vol. 6, 2012, No. 9,
pp. 1126–1130.
[17] Pang, L. J. et al.: A New ID-Based Multi-Recipient Public-key Encryption Scheme.
Chinese Journal of Electronics, Vol. 22, 2013, No. 1, pp. 89–92.
Liaojun Pang received his Bachelor and Master degrees in com-
puter science and technology from Xidian University of China,
in 2000 and 2003, respectively. In 2006, he received his Ph. D.
degree in cryptography from Xidian University of China. Cur-
rently he is an Associate Professor in School of Life Sciences and
Technology of Xidian University; he is also a visiting scholar at
the Department of Computer Science of Wayne State University
of USA. His research interests include Internet security, cryp-
tography, secure mobile agent systems and e-commerce security
technology. He became a member of IEEE in 2009.
Huixian Li received his Ph. D. degree in cryptography from
Dalian University of Technology. Now, she is an Associate pro-
fessor in the School of Computer Science and Engineering of
the Northwestern Polytechnical University, and also a visiting
scholar at the Department of Computer Science, Wayne State
University of USA. Her research interests include information se-
curity, cryptography, and security technologies for mobile health
care systems.
Yumin Wang is a Professor at the State Key Lab. of Integrated
Service Networks, Xidian University of China. His research in-
terests include cryptography, coding, and information theory.
He is a Senior Member of IEEE.
